// HackTheBox  ·  writeup

FortySeven-1

HackTheBox Very Easy SecurelistKnownsec 404 reportsWayback MachineMITRE ATT&CK
Threat Intelligence

Scenario

An APT group is using Hajj-themed phishing lures to target and steal WhatsApp data from government and diplomatic officials. Our team has gathered fragmented intelligence from public cybersecurity vendor reports, blog posts, and internal security alerts. Your task is to build a comprehensive profile of the threat actor responsible. You must connect the dots between different reports to answer questions about their identity, tools, and motives.

Below are the sites we have compiled, use these to answer the following questions. (If any of the sites become unavailable please check on wayback machine as they all have been saved).

Evidence - 1 - https://securelist.com/mysterious-elephant-apt-ttps-and-tools/117596/ Evidence - 2 - https://medium.com/@knownsec404team/apt-k-47-mysterious-elephant-a-new-apt-organization-in-south-asia-5c66f954477 Evidence - 3 - https://medium.com/@knownsec404team/unveiling-the-past-and-present-of-apt-k-47-weapon-asyncshell-5a98f75c2d68

Executive Summary

The group tracked by Kaspersky as Mysterious Elephant, and by Knownsec 404 as APT-K-47, is a South Asian actor whose tooling overlaps with another well-known regional group. Its arsenal spans an RPC-based backdoor, the evolving Asyncshell backdoor family, a sandbox-aware loader that hides in a separate desktop, and a set of stealers aimed at WhatsApp data. Delivery relies on archive files exploiting a WinRAR flaw and on heavy use of scripts, with persistence through the Startup folder. Stolen data leaves over the tools’ own C2 channels. No endpoint evidence was provided, so the whole profile was assembled from vendor reporting and MITRE ATT&CK.

Artifacts

Tip: Medium returned 403 when fetched directly. The Wayback Machine copies of both Knownsec articles (the scenario points to them too) load fine.

Resource Development

Q1 — What is the primary name of the APT group described in the SecureList report?

The Securelist article (https://securelist.com/mysterious-elephant-apt-ttps-and-tools/117596/) is titled after the group and uses that name throughout. The other names that show up in the reading (APT-K-47 from Knownsec) are aliases from other vendors.

Hint: The format mask is two words, ten letters then eight.

Click flag to reveal Mysterious Elephant
Q2 — According to the Knownsec 404 team's analysis(Evidence -3), since which year has this group's attack activity been dated back to?

Open the Asyncshell article (Evidence 3, Wayback copy) and read the opening background on the group. Knownsec states that the attack activity dates back to a specific year.

Gotcha: Asyncshell itself has been in use since 2023, which makes that year a tempting answer. The question asks for when the group’s activity starts, and Knownsec puts that earlier.

Click to reveal answer 2022
Q5 — The use of the backdoor links the APT to another well-known South Asian APT group. What is the name of this other group?

Same Knownsec APT-K-47 article (Evidence 2), in the part on the ORPC backdoor. Knownsec ties the backdoor to a long-running South Asian actor, which is how it connects the new group to existing clusters.

Click flag to reveal BITTER

Initial Access

Q12 — In their early attack chains, Mysterious Elephant used a downloader that was previously associated with the Origami Elephant group. What was the name of this downloader?

The Securelist section on the group’s early attack chains names the downloader and credits its earlier use to Origami Elephant. This is the overlap Kaspersky uses to place the group’s origins.

Click to reveal answer Vtyrei
Q13 — In a January 2024 campaign delivering an Asyncshell payload, which CVE was exploited in the malicious archive file? Be careful to use a hyphen `-` and not an emdash `—` in the flag.

The Asyncshell article (Evidence 3) describes the January 2024 campaign, where a booby-trapped archive was the delivery vehicle. The CVE is quoted in that section and matches the CVE-2023-38831 tag on the Sherlock.

Gotcha: Copying the ID from the article can bring an em dash with it. Retype the hyphens.

Click flag to reveal CVE-2023-38831

Execution

Q11 — Kaspersky's analysis highlights the actor's heavy use of scripts for execution and deploying payloads. What is the MITRE ATT&CK ID for the 'PowerShell' technique?

Reference lookup rather than a report finding. PowerShell sits under Command and Scripting Interpreter in ATT&CK, as a sub-technique (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/).

Click flag to reveal T1059.001

Persistence

Q3 — The group uses a custom backdoor that communicates via Office Remote Procedure Call (ORPCBackdoor). According to the Knownsec 404 team's analysis(Evidence -2), what is the name of the first malicious exported entry function?

In the APT-K-47 overview (Evidence 2), the ORPCBackdoor section walks through the DLL’s export table. The first malicious export is listed with its full signature, which is what the format mask (name plus a parenthesised argument) expects.

Hint: Submit the signature exactly as Knownsec prints it, including the parentheses.

Click flag to reveal GetFileVersionInfoByHandleEx(void)
Q4 — The previously mentioned backdoor checks for a file before creating persistence. What is the name of the file?

From Q3 the target is the ORPCBackdoor, so stay in the same Knownsec section. Before it sets up persistence the backdoor looks for a marker file, and the article names it.

Click to reveal answer ts.dat
Q9 — The MemLoader HidenDesk tool achieves persistence by placing a shortcut in the autostart folder to ensure it runs after a system reboot. What is the MITRE ATT&CK ID for the 'Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder' technique?

Reference lookup. Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder is the Boot or Logon Autostart Execution sub-technique that covers a shortcut dropped in the Startup folder (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/).

Click flag to reveal T1547.001

Defense Evasion

Q7 — To evade sandbox analysis, the MemLoader HidenDesk tool checks the number of active processes before running. What is the minimum number of processes required for it to proceed?

The Securelist section on MemLoader HidenDesk describes its anti-sandbox check: it counts running processes and only continues past a threshold, since analysis VMs tend to run very few. The report states the threshold.

Click flag to reveal 40
Q8 — The MemLoader HidenDesk tool creates a covert environment for its activities by creating and switching to a specific environment. What is the name of this hidden desktop?

Same Securelist section. After the process check, the loader creates a new desktop and switches to it so its activity stays out of the user’s view. The desktop’s name is in the report.

Click to reveal answer MalwareTech_Hidden

Collection

Q10 — The actor uses several custom exfiltration tools targeting WhatsApp. What is the name of the tool that recursively searches specific directories, including the “Desktop” and “Downloads” folders?

Securelist lists the WhatsApp-targeting tools one by one. Only one of them is described as walking directories recursively, with Desktop and Downloads among the folders it covers.

Click to reveal answer Stom Exfiltrator
Q14 — What is the MD5 hash of the ChromeStealer Exfiltrator sample named WhatsAppOB.exe?

The Securelist IOC appendix groups file hashes by tool, with the file name beside each. Find the ChromeStealer Exfiltrator entry for WhatsAppOB.exe and take its MD5.

Click to reveal answer 9e50adb6107067ff0bab73307f5499b6

Command and Control

Q6 — The APT group we are currently investigating has consistently used and updated another backdoor since 2023, with its C2 communication evolving from TCP to HTTPS. What is the name of this tool?

Back in the Asyncshell article (Evidence 3), section 4.3 traces the backdoor’s versions and shows the C2 channel moving from TCP to HTTPS in the newer release. The tool name carries a version suffix, matching the **********-** mask.

Click flag to reveal Asyncshell-v2

Exfiltration

Q15 — The intelligence describes multiple custom tools designed to upload stolen data to the actor's servers. According to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, what is the ID for the 'Exfiltration Over C2 Channel' technique?

Reference lookup. Exfiltration Over C2 Channel is a top-level technique under the Exfiltration tactic (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041/), so the ID has no sub-technique suffix.

Click flag to reveal T1041

Attack Summary

PhaseAction
Initial AccessEarly chains use a downloader previously tied to Origami Elephant
Initial AccessJanuary 2024 campaign delivers Asyncshell in an archive exploiting a WinRAR flaw
ExecutionHeavy use of PowerShell and other scripts to deploy payloads
Defense EvasionMemLoader HidenDesk counts running processes to dodge sandboxes, then works from a hidden desktop
PersistenceHidenDesk drops a shortcut in the Startup folder; the ORPC backdoor checks for a marker file first
Command and ControlAsyncshell moves its C2 from TCP to HTTPS in v2; the ORPC backdoor links the group to BITTER
CollectionWhatsApp stealers search user folders and a Chrome-based stealer collects browser data
ExfiltrationCustom tools upload stolen data to attacker servers over their own C2

IOCs

TypeValue
MD5 (ChromeStealer Exfiltrator, WhatsAppOB.exe)9e50adb6107067ff0bab73307f5499b6
CVECVE-2023-38831
Marker file (ORPC backdoor)ts.dat
Hidden desktopMalwareTech_Hidden
MalwareAsyncshell-v2, MemLoader HidenDesk, Stom Exfiltrator, Vtyrei, ORPCBackdoor

MITRE ATT&CK

TechniqueIDDescription
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderT1547.001HidenDesk persists through a shortcut in the Startup folder
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShellT1059.001Script-heavy execution and payload deployment
Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelT1041Custom tools upload stolen data to the actor’s servers

Defender Takeaways

Patch WinRAR and treat archives as an execution vector. The January 2024 Asyncshell campaign rode a known archive-handling CVE. Inventory WinRAR installs, enforce the fixed version, and alert on archive extractors spawning script interpreters.

Sandbox checks are a detection hint as well as an evasion. A loader that waits for 40 running processes can sit idle in a thin analysis VM. Run detonations on images with a realistic process count, and treat a process-enumeration burst followed by desktop creation as suspicious.

Watch for hidden desktops. Creating a new desktop and switching to it is rare in normal user software. Telemetry on CreateDesktop calls from unsigned or newly dropped binaries gives a behavioural detection that survives renamed samples.

Cover the Startup folder and script engines. Shortcut creation in the Startup folder (T1547.001) and PowerShell execution (T1059.001) were both core to this actor. Script block logging and file-creation monitoring on autostart paths catch both without needing the malware’s hashes.

Protect messaging data on diplomatic endpoints. The stealers go straight for WhatsApp and browser data in user folders. High-risk users benefit from restricting where chat data is stored and from alerting on bulk reads of those directories.

Conclusion

Mysterious Elephant combines archive exploits, scripts, sandbox-aware loaders and purpose-built WhatsApp stealers to take messaging data from diplomatic targets. The through-line is overlap: shared downloaders and a backdoor tied to BITTER let analysts join separate vendor reports into one actor profile.