The incident response team was tasked by Wowza Unlimited’s parent company to investigate a ransomware attack. A hash of the responsible sample was provided. The goal is to identify the ransomware group, its capabilities, infrastructure, and TTPs to assist leadership in deciding whether to pay the ransom or escalate to authorities.
SHA256: 099997fe34d613ec70da710e2ad077d421bd7db95d2aad08d750ef88989f33da

Dropping the hash into VirusTotal immediately returns a family label of ransomhub, confirmed across 54/72 vendor detections with tags including spreader and the YARA rule Multi_Ransomware_RansomHub.
RansomHub is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) group that emerged in early 2024. According to CISA advisory AA24-242A, RansomHub is formerly known as Cyclops and Knight — sharing significant code overlap, infrastructure, and features with the Knight ransomware, whose source code was sold on criminal forums in February 2024 before RansomHub’s launch. Group-IB — RansomHub RaaS
RansomHub announced its affiliate program on 2024-02-02, posting on the RAMP dark-web forum under the handle koley. The post outlined a 90/10 split model — affiliates receive 90% of ransom payments — and provided contact details for prospective members via the encrypted messenger qTox:
qTox ID: 4D598799696AD5399FABF7D40C4D1BE9F05D74CFB311047D7391AC0BF64BED47B56EEE66A528
welivesecurity
Affiliates are explicitly prohibited from attacking organizations in the following regions:
CIS, Cuba, North Korea, China Trend Micro — RansomHub Ransomware Spotlight
RansomHub affiliates have a documented history of exploiting CVE-2024-3400, a critical command injection vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS GlobalProtect that resurfaced in 2024. A PoC script used in exploitation was identified on GitHub: CVE-2024-3400 PoC — GitHub
PoC SHA-256: 53473d4ce45ba3250281d83480db7dad65e2330e080b79bd0d93b21d024f912b
RansomHub affiliates have also exploited CVE-2020-1472 (ZeroLogon), a critical Active Directory vulnerability that allows an unauthenticated attacker to gain domain access by impersonating any computer account — including the domain controller itself. Halcyon — RansomHub AD Exploitation
According to ESET Research, the threat actor QuadSwitcher was responsible for compromising a North American governmental institution in August 2024. QuadSwitcher was identified through tracking of RansomHub’s custom EDR killer tool, EDRKillShifter, which was used across attacks attributed to RansomHub, Play, Medusa, and BianLian.
During the government compromise, QuadSwitcher deployed AnyDesk for remote access using a PowerShell installation script (anydes.ps1) sourced from the Conti leaks, setting the AnyDesk password to:
Conti Leaks — AnyDesk Script
J9kzQ2Y0qO
RansomHub’s encryptor requires a passphrase to be supplied at runtime via the -pass command-line flag. This passphrase decrypts the embedded configuration file containing C2 details, exclusion lists, and target parameters. If an incorrect passphrase is provided, the malware terminates and prints the following to the console:
bad config
Group-IB — RansomHub RaaS
RansomHub provides affiliates with a custom EDR killer tool called EDRKillShifter. This loader uses a Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) technique to escalate privileges and terminate EDR/AV processes. Execution requires a 64-character password; the loader decrypts an embedded BIN resource which unpacks and executes the final payload written in Go (Golang), obfuscated using gobfuscate. Trend Micro — How RansomHub Uses EDRKillShifter
Before encryption, RansomHub executes a PowerShell command to enumerate and forcefully stop any running virtual machines:
Get-VM | Stop-VM -Force

RansomHub clears 3 Windows event logs to destroy forensic evidence:
cmd.exe /c wevtutil cl security
cmd.exe /c wevtutil cl system
cmd.exe /c wevtutil cl application
Files encrypted by RansomHub consistently exhibit the last four bytes: 0x00ABCDEF
The first line of the ransom note reads:
We are the RansomHub.
—
RansomHub operates a TOR-based Data Leak Site (DLS) where victim data is published if ransom demands are not met:
DLS: http://ransomxifxwc5eteopdobynonjctkxxvap77yqifu2emfbecgbqdw6qd.onion/
| Type | Value |
|---|---|
| SHA256 (sample) | 099997fe34d613ec70da710e2ad077d421bd7db95d2aad08d750ef88989f33da |
| SHA256 (CVE-2024-3400 PoC) | 53473d4ce45ba3250281d83480db7dad65e2330e080b79bd0d93b21d024f912b |
| qTox ID | 4D598799696AD5399FABF7D40C4D1BE9F05D74CFB311047D7391AC0BF64BED47B56EEE66A528 |
| DLS | ransomxifxwc5eteopdobynonjctkxxvap77yqifu2emfbecgbqdw6qd[.]onion |
| Encrypted file magic bytes | 0x00ABCDEF |
| Technique | ID |
|---|---|
| Exploit Public-Facing Application (PAN-OS) | T1190 |
| Exploit Public-Facing Application (ZeroLogon) | T1190 |
| Remote Access Software (AnyDesk) | T1219 |
| OS Credential Dumping | T1003 |
| Inhibit System Recovery | T1490 |
| Clear Windows Event Logs | T1070.001 |
| Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (EDRKillShifter) | T1562.001 |
| Data Encrypted for Impact | T1486 |
| Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | T1537 |