An IDS alert flagged suspicious lateral movement involving PsExec. As a SOC Analyst, the objective was to analyze the provided PCAP file, trace the attacker’s movement, identify compromised systems, and determine how the breach unfolded within the internal network.
Reviewing the PCAP revealed repeated SMB and PsExec-related traffic originating from:
10.0.0.133
This host initiated lateral movement activity consistent with PsExec behavior, confirming it as the attacker’s pivot source

Using the Wireshark filter:
`ntlmssp.challenge.target_name
The targeted hostname was identified through NTLM challenge messages
The attacker first pivoted to:
SALES-PC (10.0.0.130)

To determine which credentials were used, the following filter was applied:
`ntlmssp.auth.username
This revealed the account used for authentication during lateral movement.
The attacker authenticated using:
IEUser
This confirms valid credential abuse rather than exploit-based authentication bypass.

Exporting SMB objects revealed the service executable deployed by the attacker.
Observed service executable:
PSEXESVC.exe
This is the standard service binary dropped by PsExec to execute commands remotely.

Applying:
`smb2.tree
Revealed that PsExec used:
ADMIN$
This administrative share is commonly abused for service installation during lateral movement

Further SMB analysis confirmed that PsExec used:
IPC$
The IPC$ share was used for communication between the attacker system and the compromised host.

Further hostname analysis identified another compromised machine:
MARKETING-PC (10.0.0.131)
This confirms continued lateral movement beyond the initial pivot.
Initial lateral movement originated from HR-PC (10.0.0.133)
First pivot to SALES-PC (10.0.0.130)
Second pivot to MARKETING-PC (10.0.0.131)
Authentication performed using IEUser credentials
PsExec dropped PSEXESVC.exe via ADMIN$
Command and control communication occurred via IPC$
| Type | Value |
|---|---|
| MARKETING-PC | 10.0.0.131 |
| SALES-PC | 10.0.0.130 |
| HR-PC | 10.0.0.133 |
T1021.002 – SMB/Windows Admin Shares
T1570 – Lateral Tool Transfer
T1569.002 – Service Execution
T1078 – Valid Accounts
The investigation confirmed unauthorized lateral movement using PsExec within the internal network. The attacker leveraged valid credentials (IEUser), deployed PSEXESVC.exe through the ADMIN$ share, and used IPC$ for command communication.
Multiple systems were compromised, demonstrating effective credential abuse and administrative share exploitation.
This lab reinforces:
How PsExec lateral movement appears in PCAP
How to identify service installation via SMB
How NTLM authentication artifacts reveal attacker activity
How to reconstruct pivot chains from network traffic
I successfully completed PsExec Hunt Blue Team Lab at @CyberDefenders! https://cyberdefenders.org/blueteam-ctf-challenges/achievements/inksec/psexec-hunt/
#CyberDefenders #CyberSecurity #BlueYard #BlueTeam #InfoSec #SOC #SOCAnalyst #DFIR #CCD #CyberDefender