// CyberDefenders  ·  Network Forensics

PoisonedCredentials Lab

CyberDefenders Easy Wireshark
[Execution, Defense Evasion, Discovery, Lateral Movement]

PsExec Hunt – Lateral Movement Investigation

Scenario

An IDS alert flagged suspicious lateral movement involving PsExec. As a SOC Analyst, the objective was to analyze the provided PCAP file, trace the attacker’s movement, identify compromised systems, and determine how the breach unfolded within the internal network.


Initial Access – Attacker Source

Reviewing the PCAP revealed repeated SMB and PsExec-related traffic originating from:

10.0.0.133

This host initiated lateral movement activity consistent with PsExec behavior, confirming it as the attacker’s pivot source psexec_wireshark.png

Using the Wireshark filter:

`ntlmssp.challenge.target_name

The targeted hostname was identified through NTLM challenge messages

The attacker first pivoted to:

SALES-PC (10.0.0.130) target_hostname.png

Authentication Analysis

To determine which credentials were used, the following filter was applied:

`ntlmssp.auth.username

This revealed the account used for authentication during lateral movement.

The attacker authenticated using:

IEUser

This confirms valid credential abuse rather than exploit-based authentication bypass. target_username.png

Service Installation – PsExec Execution

Exporting SMB objects revealed the service executable deployed by the attacker.

Observed service executable:

PSEXESVC.exe

This is the standard service binary dropped by PsExec to execute commands remotely. service.png

Network Share Used for Installation

Applying:

`smb2.tree

Revealed that PsExec used:

ADMIN$

This administrative share is commonly abused for service installation during lateral movement

shares.png

Network Share Used for Communication

Further SMB analysis confirmed that PsExec used:

IPC$

The IPC$ share was used for communication between the attacker system and the compromised host. file_transfer.png

Second Pivot – Additional Compromised Host

Further hostname analysis identified another compromised machine:

MARKETING-PC (10.0.0.131)

This confirms continued lateral movement beyond the initial pivot.

Full Attack Path Reconstruction

  1. Initial lateral movement originated from HR-PC (10.0.0.133)

  2. First pivot to SALES-PC (10.0.0.130)

  3. Second pivot to MARKETING-PC (10.0.0.131)

  4. Authentication performed using IEUser credentials

  5. PsExec dropped PSEXESVC.exe via ADMIN$

  6. Command and control communication occurred via IPC$

IOCs

Type Value
MARKETING-PC 10.0.0.131
SALES-PC 10.0.0.130
HR-PC 10.0.0.133
   

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping


Conclusion

The investigation confirmed unauthorized lateral movement using PsExec within the internal network. The attacker leveraged valid credentials (IEUser), deployed PSEXESVC.exe through the ADMIN$ share, and used IPC$ for command communication.

Multiple systems were compromised, demonstrating effective credential abuse and administrative share exploitation.

This lab reinforces:


I successfully completed PsExec Hunt Blue Team Lab at @CyberDefenders! https://cyberdefenders.org/blueteam-ctf-challenges/achievements/inksec/psexec-hunt/

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