You are a cybercrime investigator, and this is your starting point. Your task is not to analyze the malware — it is to follow the intelligence. From one hash, you will identify a ransomware operation that extorted over half a billion dollars from victims across every continent, trace the two-year international investigation that dismantled it from the inside, and track what happened to the group — and the ecosystem around it — in the months and years that followed.
LockBit is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation that between 2021 and 2023 was the most widely deployed ransomware variant globally, responsible for an estimated 25–33% of all ransomware attacks worldwide. In 2023 alone, Cyberint attributed approximately 1,047 victims to LockBit — over 24% of all monitored ransomware attacks that year. The group extorted more than $120 million in confirmed ransom payments from over 2,000 victims across financial services, healthcare, manufacturing, education, government, and critical infrastructure. Its RaaS model, aggressive brand management, and professional affiliate program made it the dominant force in the ransomware ecosystem until its disruption by Operation Cronos in February 2024.
Trend Micro tracks LockBit under the intrinsic name Water Selkie.
LockBit first appeared in September 2019 under the name ABCD ransomware, named after the .abcd file extension it appended to encrypted files. Within months the operators rebranded, switching to the .lockbit extension and building out dedicated victim negotiation infrastructure — the point at which the LockBit name was born.
In January 2020 the group formally launched its RaaS affiliate program, recruiting external threat actors to deploy the ransomware in exchange for a cut of ransom proceeds. The group retained 20% of each payment, with affiliates keeping 80%. This model allowed rapid scaling without the operators needing to conduct attacks themselves.
Version timeline:
| Date | Version | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| September 2019 | ABCD ransomware | Original variant, .abcd extension |
| January 2020 | LockBit 1.0 | RaaS affiliate program launched |
| September 2020 | — | Dedicated leak site created |
| June 2021 | LockBit 2.0 (LockBit Red) | StealBit custom exfil tool introduced |
| March 2022 | LockBit 3.0 (LockBit Black) | Bug bounty program, Zcash payments, modular design |
| September 2022 | — | LockBit 3.0 builder leaked by disgruntled developer |
| January 2023 | LockBit Green | Incorporated Conti v3 source code |
| February 2024 | LockBit-NG-Dev | In-development .NET cross-platform build, seized by Operation Cronos |
| December 2024 | LockBit 4.0 | Rebuilt post-Cronos |
| September 2025 | LockBit 5.0 (ChuongDong) | Cross-platform Windows/Linux/ESXi support |
LockBit operated with the professionalism of a criminal enterprise rather than a loose hacking collective. LockBitSupp — the online persona of the group’s administrator, later identified as Dmitry Yuryevich Khoroshev — actively managed the brand, communicated with affiliates via Tox encrypted messaging, and ran the operation with a point-and-click affiliate interface that lowered the technical barrier for entry.
Affiliates communicated and registered via the qTox platform. The affiliate program qTox ID was 4D598799696AD5399FABF7D40C4D1BE9F05D74CFB311047D7391AC0BF64BED47B56EEE66A528.
The program’s rules explicitly prohibited attacks on organisations in CIS countries, Cuba, North Korea, and China. Affiliates who violated these rules or attacked prohibited targets (such as the SickKids children’s hospital attack in December 2022) faced expulsion and had free decryptors issued to victims.
LockBit was also the first ransomware group to launch a bug bounty program in 2022, offering up to $1 million for vulnerabilities in its website and locker software. In a notable branding stunt, LockBitSupp offered $1,000 to anyone who tattooed the LockBit logo on their body — approximately 20 people took up the offer.
When accessed from inside the seized admin panel during Operation Cronos, investigators found 1,912 victims recorded in the listing tab and 193 affiliate accounts registered on the platform (excluding the admin account).
LockBit pioneered and refined the double extortion model — encrypting victim systems while simultaneously exfiltrating data and threatening publication on its dedicated leak site (DLS) if ransom demands were not met. In August 2022, following a DDoS attack against its own infrastructure after the Entrust breach, LockBitSupp announced plans to add DDoS as a third pressure tactic, creating a triple extortion model: encryption + data leak threat + DDoS.
LockBit’s DLS operated as a TOR-hosted site at:
ransomxifxwc5eteopdobynonjctkxxvap77yqifu2emfbecgbqdw6qd[.]onion
Data exfiltration was handled by StealBit, LockBit’s bespoke custom tool that automated the upload of stolen data to LockBit-controlled infrastructure. Affiliates also used rclone as an alternative.
Contrary to LockBit’s promises to victims that data would be deleted upon payment, data obtained during Operation Cronos confirmed that stolen data was routinely retained after ransoms were paid.
Atento (October 2021) — CRM services provider hit by LockBit 2.0. Financial impact reported at $42.1 million ($34.8M revenue loss, $7.3M mitigation costs) — one of the most publicly documented single-incident ransomware cost disclosures.
Royal Mail (January 2023) — LockBit attacked the UK’s national postal service, causing severe disruption to international deliveries. One of LockBit’s highest-profile public-sector victims.
TSMC (June 2023) — LockBit claimed to have breached the world’s largest semiconductor manufacturer via a supplier compromise of Kinmax Technology. Ransom demand: $70 million — among the largest ever publicly issued. TSMC denied a direct breach; Kinmax confirmed the supplier-side incident. The attack was claimed by the National Hazard Agency subgroup, with Bassterlord (Ivan Kondratyev) live-tweeting the attack.
ICBC Financial Services (November 2023) — LockBit hit the US broker-dealer of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, disrupting settlement of more than $9 billion in Treasury-backed securities. LockBit later claimed ICBC paid the ransom.
Boeing (November 2023) — LockBit published stolen internal data from one of the world’s largest aerospace companies after ransom negotiations broke down.
Federal Reserve (June 2024) — LockBit listed federalreserve.gov on its leak site, claiming 33 terabytes of stolen banking data. The negotiator reportedly offered $50,000, which LockBitSupp publicly mocked as valuing “Americans’ bank secrecy at $50,000.” After the deadline passed, the published data was identified as belonging to Evolve Bank & Trust, not the Federal Reserve — widely seen as a credibility-damaging fabrication in the post-Cronos period.
National Hazard Agency — A recognised LockBit subgroup led by Ivan Kondratyev, alias Bassterlord. Responsible for the TSMC claim and numerous high-profile attacks. Kondratyev was indicted and sanctioned by OFAC in February 2024 alongside Artur Sungatov. OFAC included 10 cryptocurrency wallet addresses across both designations (9 for Kondratyev, 1 for Sungatov).
UNC2165 / Evil Corp connection — Mandiant identified a cluster of Evil Corp-affiliated threat actors (tracked as UNC2165) who pivoted from using exclusive Evil Corp ransomware variants like HADES to deploying LockBit, likely to evade US sanctions imposed on Evil Corp in 2019. Initial access was obtained almost exclusively via the FakeUpdates (SocGholish) infection chain, tracked as UNC1543.
QuadSwitcher — ESET-identified threat actor responsible for compromising a North American governmental institution in August 2024, deploying AnyDesk via a PowerShell script (anydes.ps1) sourced from the Conti leaks with the password J9kzQ2Y0qO. QuadSwitcher was tracked via LockBit’s custom EDR killer tool, EDRKillShifter.
Aleksandr Ryzhenkov (alias Beverley) — Identified in Operation Cronos Phase 3 (October 2024) as both a senior Evil Corp member and a LockBit affiliate. Made over 60 LockBit ransomware builds and sought to extort at least $100 million from victims. Sanctioned by Australia, UK, and US simultaneously.
Initial Access
LockBit affiliates used diverse initial access methods depending on the affiliate involved. Common vectors documented in CISA AA23-165A include:
Lateral Movement and Credential Access
Post-compromise activity typically involved Cobalt Strike beacons for lateral movement, Mimikatz for credential dumping, and Kerberoasting. Native Windows utilities and open-source tools such as Advanced Port Scanner were used for reconnaissance.
Encryption
LockBit 3.0 encrypts files using a modified Salsa20 algorithm with a random 64-byte initial state and non-standard sigma constants. The encrypted file extension, ransom note filename, and wallpaper name are all the same randomly generated string per infection — making static detection by extension impossible. Files encrypted by LockBit consistently exhibit the last four bytes 0x00ABCDEF as a magic bytes signature.
The ransom note format is [random9chars].README.txt. The first line reads: “We are the RansomHub.” — wait, wrong group. LockBit’s ransom note format is dynamic per build, formerly Restore-My-Files.txt in earlier versions.
EDR Evasion — EDRKillShifter
LockBit provides affiliates with EDRKillShifter, a custom EDR killer using a Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) technique to escalate privileges and terminate security processes. The loader requires a 64-character password and delivers a final payload written in Go (Golang), obfuscated using gobfuscate.
Pre-encryption Actions
Before encryption, LockBit executes:
Get-VM | Stop-VM -Force
to terminate virtual machines, then clears 3 Windows event logs:
cmd.exe /c wevtutil cl security
cmd.exe /c wevtutil cl system
cmd.exe /c wevtutil cl application
Background
Operation Cronos was a sustained covert investigation into LockBit formally opened at Eurojust in April 2022 at the request of French authorities. Over nearly two years, the taskforce conducted 27 operational meetings and 4 technical week-long sprints before moving to the public phase.
The Takedown — February 2024
At approximately 20:00 GMT on February 19, 2024, LockBit’s onion sites began returning 404 errors. By 21:00 GMT the sites were back online — replaced with a law enforcement seizure banner. The public announcement came on February 20, 2024, with a press conference in London led by NCA Director General Graeme Biggar: “We have hacked the hackers.”
Participating countries (10): UK (NCA lead), USA (FBI/DOJ), France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Australia, Canada, Japan, Switzerland. Finland’s NBI provided additional support.
Servers seized: 34 servers across 8 countries — Australia, Netherlands, Germany, Finland, France, Switzerland, United States, and United Kingdom.
Financial disruption: Over 200 cryptocurrency accounts frozen.
Arrests: Two LockBit actors arrested in Poland and Ukraine at the request of French judicial authorities (Europol-coordinated). A further 3 arrest warrants and 5 indictments issued.
Decryption keys: Over 1,000 decryption keys recovered by the NCA from seized infrastructure.
Additional seizures: LockBit’s source code, StealBit infrastructure, 14,000 rogue accounts identified and referred for closure, and 30,000 Bitcoin addresses used for ransom payment management.
Private sector partners: Trend Micro, Prodaft, Secureworks.
Inside the Admin Panel
Trend Micro’s analysis of the seized admin panel revealed:
Phase 2 — May 2024
Three months after the infrastructure seizure, Operation Cronos entered its second phase with the public unmasking of LockBitSupp as Dmitry Yuryevich Khoroshev, a Russian national born 17 April 1993 from Voronezh. Charged with 26 criminal counts carrying a maximum sentence of 185 years in prison. A $10 million reward offered by the US Department of State for information leading to his arrest.
Phase 3 — October 2024
Four additional arrests across France, UK, and Spain. Nine servers seized by Spanish authorities. Aleksandr Ryzhenkov identified as LockBit affiliate Beverley and linked to Evil Corp. Sanctions issued against 16 Evil Corp members across UK, US, and Australia simultaneously.
On February 24, 2024 — four days after the seizure — LockBitSupp released a lengthy PGP-signed statement admitting the compromise and announcing rebuilt infrastructure. Key claims:
In a subsequent interview with the Click Here podcast (May 2024), LockBitSupp denied being Khoroshev, dismissed Operation Cronos as a bluff, and when asked if he had a message for the world responded: “Join my affiliate program and get rich with me.”
On May 7, 2025, LockBit’s dark web affiliate and admin panels were compromised by an unknown actor signing themselves “xoxo from Prague.” The panels were defaced and replaced with the message:
Don’t do crime CRIME IS BAD xoxo from Prague
A download link to paneldb_dump.zip was included — a full MySQL database dump of LockBit’s affiliate panel spanning December 18, 2024 to April 29, 2025, containing:
Weekendlover69, MovingBricks69420, Lockbitproud231)The defacement message matched one used against the Everest ransomware group’s DLS in April 2025, suggesting a common actor. LockBitSupp confirmed the breach via Tox but claimed no private keys or source code were lost.
In September 2025, coinciding with the group’s sixth anniversary, LockBit officially announced its return with LockBit 5.0, internally codenamed ChuongDong. Key capabilities:
.vmdk, .vmx, .vswp files; powers off VMs via vim-cmd vmsvc/power.off before encryptionBy September 2025, Check Point Research had identified approximately a dozen victim organisations, with roughly half infected by LockBit 5.0 and the remainder by LockBit Black (3.0), spanning Western Europe, the Americas, and Asia.
| Technique | ID | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Exploit Public-Facing Application | T1190 | Citrix Bleed CVE-2023-4966, ZeroLogon CVE-2020-1472, PAN-OS CVE-2024-3400, Fortigate CVE-2018-13379 |
| Valid Accounts | T1078 | Credentials purchased via Initial Access Brokers |
| External Remote Services | T1133 | RDP/VPN brute force and exploitation |
| Phishing: Drive-by Compromise | T1189 | SocGholish/FakeUpdates (UNC2165/Evil Corp affiliates) |
| OS Credential Dumping | T1003 | Mimikatz used by affiliates |
| Remote Access Software | T1219 | AnyDesk deployed by QuadSwitcher affiliate |
| Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools | T1562.001 | Windows Defender disabled; EDRKillShifter BYOVD technique |
| Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs | T1070.001 | security, system, application logs cleared via wevtutil |
| Data Encrypted for Impact | T1486 | Modified Salsa20 (LockBit 3.0); AES+RSA (LockBit-NG-Dev) |
| Inhibit System Recovery | T1490 | Shadow copy deletion, VM termination via Get-VM / Stop-VM |
| Service Stop | T1489 | Services terminated pre-encryption |
| Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | T1041 | StealBit automated exfil to LockBit infrastructure |
| Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | T1537 | rclone used by affiliates as StealBit alternative |
| Obfuscated Files or Information | T1027 | Encrypted executables, random passwords, gobfuscate (EDRKillShifter payload) |
| Type | Value |
|---|---|
| qTox ID (affiliate comms) | 4D598799696AD5399FABF7D40C4D1BE9F05D74CFB311047D7391AC0BF64BED47B56EEE66A528 |
| DLS (historical, seized) | ransomxifxwc5eteopdobynonjctkxxvap77yqifu2emfbecgbqdw6qd[.]onion |
| Encrypted file magic bytes | 0x00ABCDEF |
| SHA256 (CVE-2024-3400 PoC) | 53473d4ce45ba3250281d83480db7dad65e2330e080b79bd0d93b21d024f912b |
| OFAC wallet addresses | 10 total — 9 (Kondratyev), 1 (Sungatov) |
| May 2025 DB dump | paneldb_dump.zip |