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Operation Cronos - Lockbit

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Scenario

You are a cybercrime investigator, and this is your starting point. Your task is not to analyze the malware — it is to follow the intelligence. From one hash, you will identify a ransomware operation that extorted over half a billion dollars from victims across every continent, trace the two-year international investigation that dismantled it from the inside, and track what happened to the group — and the ecosystem around it — in the months and years that followed.


LockBit & Operation Cronos — Threat Intelligence Profile

Overview

LockBit is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation that between 2021 and 2023 was the most widely deployed ransomware variant globally, responsible for an estimated 25–33% of all ransomware attacks worldwide. In 2023 alone, Cyberint attributed approximately 1,047 victims to LockBit — over 24% of all monitored ransomware attacks that year. The group extorted more than $120 million in confirmed ransom payments from over 2,000 victims across financial services, healthcare, manufacturing, education, government, and critical infrastructure. Its RaaS model, aggressive brand management, and professional affiliate program made it the dominant force in the ransomware ecosystem until its disruption by Operation Cronos in February 2024.

Trend Micro tracks LockBit under the intrinsic name Water Selkie.


Origins and Evolution

LockBit first appeared in September 2019 under the name ABCD ransomware, named after the .abcd file extension it appended to encrypted files. Within months the operators rebranded, switching to the .lockbit extension and building out dedicated victim negotiation infrastructure — the point at which the LockBit name was born.

In January 2020 the group formally launched its RaaS affiliate program, recruiting external threat actors to deploy the ransomware in exchange for a cut of ransom proceeds. The group retained 20% of each payment, with affiliates keeping 80%. This model allowed rapid scaling without the operators needing to conduct attacks themselves.

Version timeline:

DateVersionNotes
September 2019ABCD ransomwareOriginal variant, .abcd extension
January 2020LockBit 1.0RaaS affiliate program launched
September 2020—Dedicated leak site created
June 2021LockBit 2.0 (LockBit Red)StealBit custom exfil tool introduced
March 2022LockBit 3.0 (LockBit Black)Bug bounty program, Zcash payments, modular design
September 2022—LockBit 3.0 builder leaked by disgruntled developer
January 2023LockBit GreenIncorporated Conti v3 source code
February 2024LockBit-NG-DevIn-development .NET cross-platform build, seized by Operation Cronos
December 2024LockBit 4.0Rebuilt post-Cronos
September 2025LockBit 5.0 (ChuongDong)Cross-platform Windows/Linux/ESXi support

RaaS Business Model

LockBit operated with the professionalism of a criminal enterprise rather than a loose hacking collective. LockBitSupp — the online persona of the group’s administrator, later identified as Dmitry Yuryevich Khoroshev — actively managed the brand, communicated with affiliates via Tox encrypted messaging, and ran the operation with a point-and-click affiliate interface that lowered the technical barrier for entry.

Affiliates communicated and registered via the qTox platform. The affiliate program qTox ID was 4D598799696AD5399FABF7D40C4D1BE9F05D74CFB311047D7391AC0BF64BED47B56EEE66A528.

The program’s rules explicitly prohibited attacks on organisations in CIS countries, Cuba, North Korea, and China. Affiliates who violated these rules or attacked prohibited targets (such as the SickKids children’s hospital attack in December 2022) faced expulsion and had free decryptors issued to victims.

LockBit was also the first ransomware group to launch a bug bounty program in 2022, offering up to $1 million for vulnerabilities in its website and locker software. In a notable branding stunt, LockBitSupp offered $1,000 to anyone who tattooed the LockBit logo on their body — approximately 20 people took up the offer.

When accessed from inside the seized admin panel during Operation Cronos, investigators found 1,912 victims recorded in the listing tab and 193 affiliate accounts registered on the platform (excluding the admin account).


Extortion Model

LockBit pioneered and refined the double extortion model — encrypting victim systems while simultaneously exfiltrating data and threatening publication on its dedicated leak site (DLS) if ransom demands were not met. In August 2022, following a DDoS attack against its own infrastructure after the Entrust breach, LockBitSupp announced plans to add DDoS as a third pressure tactic, creating a triple extortion model: encryption + data leak threat + DDoS.

LockBit’s DLS operated as a TOR-hosted site at:
ransomxifxwc5eteopdobynonjctkxxvap77yqifu2emfbecgbqdw6qd[.]onion

Data exfiltration was handled by StealBit, LockBit’s bespoke custom tool that automated the upload of stolen data to LockBit-controlled infrastructure. Affiliates also used rclone as an alternative.

Contrary to LockBit’s promises to victims that data would be deleted upon payment, data obtained during Operation Cronos confirmed that stolen data was routinely retained after ransoms were paid.


Notable Attacks

Atento (October 2021) — CRM services provider hit by LockBit 2.0. Financial impact reported at $42.1 million ($34.8M revenue loss, $7.3M mitigation costs) — one of the most publicly documented single-incident ransomware cost disclosures.

Royal Mail (January 2023) — LockBit attacked the UK’s national postal service, causing severe disruption to international deliveries. One of LockBit’s highest-profile public-sector victims.

TSMC (June 2023) — LockBit claimed to have breached the world’s largest semiconductor manufacturer via a supplier compromise of Kinmax Technology. Ransom demand: $70 million — among the largest ever publicly issued. TSMC denied a direct breach; Kinmax confirmed the supplier-side incident. The attack was claimed by the National Hazard Agency subgroup, with Bassterlord (Ivan Kondratyev) live-tweeting the attack.

ICBC Financial Services (November 2023) — LockBit hit the US broker-dealer of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, disrupting settlement of more than $9 billion in Treasury-backed securities. LockBit later claimed ICBC paid the ransom.

Boeing (November 2023) — LockBit published stolen internal data from one of the world’s largest aerospace companies after ransom negotiations broke down.

Federal Reserve (June 2024) — LockBit listed federalreserve.gov on its leak site, claiming 33 terabytes of stolen banking data. The negotiator reportedly offered $50,000, which LockBitSupp publicly mocked as valuing “Americans’ bank secrecy at $50,000.” After the deadline passed, the published data was identified as belonging to Evolve Bank & Trust, not the Federal Reserve — widely seen as a credibility-damaging fabrication in the post-Cronos period.


Threat Actor Affiliates and Subgroups

National Hazard Agency — A recognised LockBit subgroup led by Ivan Kondratyev, alias Bassterlord. Responsible for the TSMC claim and numerous high-profile attacks. Kondratyev was indicted and sanctioned by OFAC in February 2024 alongside Artur Sungatov. OFAC included 10 cryptocurrency wallet addresses across both designations (9 for Kondratyev, 1 for Sungatov).

UNC2165 / Evil Corp connection — Mandiant identified a cluster of Evil Corp-affiliated threat actors (tracked as UNC2165) who pivoted from using exclusive Evil Corp ransomware variants like HADES to deploying LockBit, likely to evade US sanctions imposed on Evil Corp in 2019. Initial access was obtained almost exclusively via the FakeUpdates (SocGholish) infection chain, tracked as UNC1543.

QuadSwitcher — ESET-identified threat actor responsible for compromising a North American governmental institution in August 2024, deploying AnyDesk via a PowerShell script (anydes.ps1) sourced from the Conti leaks with the password J9kzQ2Y0qO. QuadSwitcher was tracked via LockBit’s custom EDR killer tool, EDRKillShifter.

Aleksandr Ryzhenkov (alias Beverley) — Identified in Operation Cronos Phase 3 (October 2024) as both a senior Evil Corp member and a LockBit affiliate. Made over 60 LockBit ransomware builds and sought to extort at least $100 million from victims. Sanctioned by Australia, UK, and US simultaneously.


Technical Analysis

Initial Access

LockBit affiliates used diverse initial access methods depending on the affiliate involved. Common vectors documented in CISA AA23-165A include:

Lateral Movement and Credential Access

Post-compromise activity typically involved Cobalt Strike beacons for lateral movement, Mimikatz for credential dumping, and Kerberoasting. Native Windows utilities and open-source tools such as Advanced Port Scanner were used for reconnaissance.

Encryption

LockBit 3.0 encrypts files using a modified Salsa20 algorithm with a random 64-byte initial state and non-standard sigma constants. The encrypted file extension, ransom note filename, and wallpaper name are all the same randomly generated string per infection — making static detection by extension impossible. Files encrypted by LockBit consistently exhibit the last four bytes 0x00ABCDEF as a magic bytes signature.

The ransom note format is [random9chars].README.txt. The first line reads: “We are the RansomHub.” — wait, wrong group. LockBit’s ransom note format is dynamic per build, formerly Restore-My-Files.txt in earlier versions.

EDR Evasion — EDRKillShifter

LockBit provides affiliates with EDRKillShifter, a custom EDR killer using a Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) technique to escalate privileges and terminate security processes. The loader requires a 64-character password and delivers a final payload written in Go (Golang), obfuscated using gobfuscate.

Pre-encryption Actions

Before encryption, LockBit executes:

Get-VM | Stop-VM -Force

to terminate virtual machines, then clears 3 Windows event logs:

cmd.exe /c wevtutil cl security
cmd.exe /c wevtutil cl system  
cmd.exe /c wevtutil cl application

Operation Cronos

Background

Operation Cronos was a sustained covert investigation into LockBit formally opened at Eurojust in April 2022 at the request of French authorities. Over nearly two years, the taskforce conducted 27 operational meetings and 4 technical week-long sprints before moving to the public phase.

The Takedown — February 2024

At approximately 20:00 GMT on February 19, 2024, LockBit’s onion sites began returning 404 errors. By 21:00 GMT the sites were back online — replaced with a law enforcement seizure banner. The public announcement came on February 20, 2024, with a press conference in London led by NCA Director General Graeme Biggar: “We have hacked the hackers.”

Participating countries (10): UK (NCA lead), USA (FBI/DOJ), France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Australia, Canada, Japan, Switzerland. Finland’s NBI provided additional support.

Servers seized: 34 servers across 8 countries — Australia, Netherlands, Germany, Finland, France, Switzerland, United States, and United Kingdom.

Financial disruption: Over 200 cryptocurrency accounts frozen.

Arrests: Two LockBit actors arrested in Poland and Ukraine at the request of French judicial authorities (Europol-coordinated). A further 3 arrest warrants and 5 indictments issued.

Decryption keys: Over 1,000 decryption keys recovered by the NCA from seized infrastructure.

Additional seizures: LockBit’s source code, StealBit infrastructure, 14,000 rogue accounts identified and referred for closure, and 30,000 Bitcoin addresses used for ransom payment management.

Private sector partners: Trend Micro, Prodaft, Secureworks.

Inside the Admin Panel

Trend Micro’s analysis of the seized admin panel revealed:

Phase 2 — May 2024

Three months after the infrastructure seizure, Operation Cronos entered its second phase with the public unmasking of LockBitSupp as Dmitry Yuryevich Khoroshev, a Russian national born 17 April 1993 from Voronezh. Charged with 26 criminal counts carrying a maximum sentence of 185 years in prison. A $10 million reward offered by the US Department of State for information leading to his arrest.

Phase 3 — October 2024

Four additional arrests across France, UK, and Spain. Nine servers seized by Spanish authorities. Aleksandr Ryzhenkov identified as LockBit affiliate Beverley and linked to Evil Corp. Sanctions issued against 16 Evil Corp members across UK, US, and Australia simultaneously.


LockBitSupp Post-Cronos Statement

On February 24, 2024 — four days after the seizure — LockBitSupp released a lengthy PGP-signed statement admitting the compromise and announcing rebuilt infrastructure. Key claims:

In a subsequent interview with the Click Here podcast (May 2024), LockBitSupp denied being Khoroshev, dismissed Operation Cronos as a bluff, and when asked if he had a message for the world responded: “Join my affiliate program and get rich with me.”


May 2025 — LockBit Hacked

On May 7, 2025, LockBit’s dark web affiliate and admin panels were compromised by an unknown actor signing themselves “xoxo from Prague.” The panels were defaced and replaced with the message:

Don’t do crime CRIME IS BAD xoxo from Prague

A download link to paneldb_dump.zip was included — a full MySQL database dump of LockBit’s affiliate panel spanning December 18, 2024 to April 29, 2025, containing:

The defacement message matched one used against the Everest ransomware group’s DLS in April 2025, suggesting a common actor. LockBitSupp confirmed the breach via Tox but claimed no private keys or source code were lost.


LockBit 5.0 — ChuongDong

In September 2025, coinciding with the group’s sixth anniversary, LockBit officially announced its return with LockBit 5.0, internally codenamed ChuongDong. Key capabilities:

By September 2025, Check Point Research had identified approximately a dozen victim organisations, with roughly half infected by LockBit 5.0 and the remainder by LockBit Black (3.0), spanning Western Europe, the Americas, and Asia.


MITRE ATT&CK

TechniqueIDDescription
Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationT1190Citrix Bleed CVE-2023-4966, ZeroLogon CVE-2020-1472, PAN-OS CVE-2024-3400, Fortigate CVE-2018-13379
Valid AccountsT1078Credentials purchased via Initial Access Brokers
External Remote ServicesT1133RDP/VPN brute force and exploitation
Phishing: Drive-by CompromiseT1189SocGholish/FakeUpdates (UNC2165/Evil Corp affiliates)
OS Credential DumpingT1003Mimikatz used by affiliates
Remote Access SoftwareT1219AnyDesk deployed by QuadSwitcher affiliate
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify ToolsT1562.001Windows Defender disabled; EDRKillShifter BYOVD technique
Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event LogsT1070.001security, system, application logs cleared via wevtutil
Data Encrypted for ImpactT1486Modified Salsa20 (LockBit 3.0); AES+RSA (LockBit-NG-Dev)
Inhibit System RecoveryT1490Shadow copy deletion, VM termination via Get-VM / Stop-VM
Service StopT1489Services terminated pre-encryption
Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelT1041StealBit automated exfil to LockBit infrastructure
Exfiltration to Cloud StorageT1537rclone used by affiliates as StealBit alternative
Obfuscated Files or InformationT1027Encrypted executables, random passwords, gobfuscate (EDRKillShifter payload)

IOCs

TypeValue
qTox ID (affiliate comms)4D598799696AD5399FABF7D40C4D1BE9F05D74CFB311047D7391AC0BF64BED47B56EEE66A528
DLS (historical, seized)ransomxifxwc5eteopdobynonjctkxxvap77yqifu2emfbecgbqdw6qd[.]onion
Encrypted file magic bytes0x00ABCDEF
SHA256 (CVE-2024-3400 PoC)53473d4ce45ba3250281d83480db7dad65e2330e080b79bd0d93b21d024f912b
OFAC wallet addresses10 total — 9 (Kondratyev), 1 (Sungatov)
May 2025 DB dumppaneldb_dump.zip

Sources


Investigators recovered a ransom-related file hash from the compromised environment. Submitting the hash to VirusTotal returns a positive match to a known ransomware family. Which ransomware family are these artifacts associated with?
Click flag to reveal LockBit
Before the ransomware adopted the brand name identified in Q1, it appeared on Russian-language cybercrime forums under a different name. What earlier name did this ransomware use, and in what year was it first publicly observed on those forums?
Click to reveal answer ABCD, 2019
The ransomware’s transformation from a standalone malware family into a scalable criminal business began when it formalized its affiliate model, recruiting other cybercriminals to deploy its tools in exchange for a cut of ransom payments. When did LockBit formally launch its Ransomware-as-a-Service operations?
Click flag to reveal 2020
`SOCRadar`’s LockBit 3.0 profile describes the financial impact of a 2021 LockBit attack against `Atento`, a customer relationship management company. The report notes that the incident caused both revenue loss and mitigation expenses, showing that the cost of ransomware can extend beyond the ransom itself. According to `SOCRadar`’s LockBit 3.0 profile, how many million dollars in total financial loss did `Atento` report from the 2021 LockBit attack?
Click to reveal answer 42.1
LockBit’s core extortion model was double extortion: encrypt the victim’s systems and steal data, then threaten to publish it unless the ransom was paid. In some cases, operators added a third pressure tactic, making the model triple extortion. What third pressure tactic did LockBit add to double extortion?
Click flag to reveal DDoS
LockBit’s administrators treated the group’s brand as something worth promoting. In 2022, LockBitSupp — the online identity used by the person who built, ran, and spoke for LockBit — ran a publicity campaign offering money to anyone willing to get the LockBit logo permanently tattooed on their body. How many dollars did LockBitSupp offer for getting a LockBit logo tattoo?
Click to reveal answer 1000
By the time LockBit matured, it was no longer an emerging threat but one of the most widely deployed ransomware families in the world. In what year did LockBit become the most deployed ransomware variant globally?
Click flag to reveal 2022
In its Ransomware Trends and Statistics 2023 Report, `Cyberint` described LockBit as the most active ransomware group of 2023, continuing the dominance it gained after Conti shut down. The report measured LockBit’s activity by both victim count and share of monitored ransomware attacks. How many victims did Cyberint attribute to LockBit in 2023, and what percentage of total monitored ransomware attacks did that represent?
Click to reveal answer 1047, 24
In January 2023, LockBit hit a major UK national institution in an attack that caused immediate and visible disruption to the public. Which UK institution was hit, resulting in severe disruption to international deliveries?
Click flag to reveal Royal Mail
In June 2023, LockBit claimed to have breached TSMC, the world’s largest semiconductor manufacturer. The claim was later clarified as a supplier breach rather than a direct compromise of TSMC itself, but LockBit still used TSMC’s name to issue one of its largest public ransom demands. How many million dollars did LockBit demand in this incident?
Click to reveal answer 70
In November 2023, LockBit hit the US broker-dealer of a major international bank. The attack disrupted systems and affected settlement of more than $9 billion worth of Treasury-backed securities. Which bank’s US broker-dealer was attacked?
Click flag to reveal Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
Also in November 2023, LockBit published stolen internal data from one of the world’s largest aerospace companies after ransom negotiations broke down. Which aerospace company did LockBit leak data from?
Click to reveal answer Boeing
While LockBit was posting victims to its leak site and collecting ransoms, the damage it was inflicting had reached a scale that demanded an unprecedented response. Thousands of victims, hundreds of millions of dollars in ransom payments, and affiliates operating across every continent. No single agency had the reach, the jurisdiction, or the resources to take this ransom group on alone. The only answer was a coordinated international task force built across a dozen countries. That task force became Operation Cronos. When was Operation Cronos officially opened?
Click flag to reveal 2022-04
Operation Cronos required sustained coordination across law-enforcement agencies, prosecution authorities, and technical teams from multiple countries. How many countries participated as core taskforce members?
Click to reveal answer 10
Multiple agencies across the world contributed to the operation, but one national agency led the overall effort. Which UK agency led Operation Cronos?
Click flag to reveal National Crime Agency
After a long covert investigation, Operation Cronos moved into its public phase. On that day, LockBit's dark web sites began showing signs of disruption — first it gave connection errors, then something the criminal underground had never seen before: a law enforcement seizure banner replacing LockBit's own leak site, displaying the flags and badges of every agency that had taken part in the operation. On what date did the seizure banner appear on LockBit's sites?
Click to reveal answer 2024-02-19
Europol's official post-operation disclosure revealed the full technical scope of what Operation Cronos had dismantled — not just a website takedown, but a simultaneous strike against LockBit's entire server infrastructure across multiple countries. How many total servers were seized, and across how many countries?
Click flag to reveal 34, 8
In addition to seizing servers, Operation Cronos included a financial-disruption component targeting cryptocurrency infrastructure used in ransom payment flows. Over how many cryptocurrency accounts were frozen as part of the operation?
Click to reveal answer 200
This disruption was also paired with physical arrests of suspected LockBit-associated actors in Europe, made at the request of French judicial authorities. In which two countries were LockBit actors arrested during the operation?
Click flag to reveal Poland, Ukraine
One of the most direct outcomes of Operation Cronos was the recovery of decryption keys from LockBit’s seized infrastructure, giving victims a way to recover data without paying a ransom. Over how many decryption keys did the NCA recover?
Click to reveal answer 1000
`Trend Micro` also published a detailed analysis of what investigators found inside LockBit's seized infrastructure. When investigators accessed the admin panel, they found two numbers that revealed the true scale of the operation from the inside — the number of victims recorded by LockBit itself and the number of affiliate accounts registered on the platform.
Click flag to reveal 1912, 193
Also in `Trend Micro` analysis, two Russian nationals were indicted and sanctioned by OFAC — the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control, responsible for enforcing economic and trade sanctions. One of them, Ivan Kondratyev, also known as Bassterlord, led a recognized LockBit subgroup. What was the name of that subgroup?
Click to reveal answer National Hazard Agency
As part of the sanctions against Artur Sungatov and Ivan Kondratyev, OFAC included cryptocurrency wallet addresses in their SDN designations to help exchanges and financial institutions block transactions linked to both individuals. How many wallet addresses were included in total?
Click flag to reveal 10
For a couple of days after Operation Cronos, LockBit was silent. No word, no new victims, no response. But then LockBitSupp reappeared with a bold PGP-signed statement admitting the vulnerability that had allowed law enforcement in — and simultaneously announced that rebuilt infrastructure was back online. Find this statement, on what date did LockBitSupp release this statement?
Click to reveal answer 2024-02-24
In his post-disruption statement, LockBitSupp admitted that running an outdated version of PHP had allowed law enforcement to gain access to LockBit’s infrastructure. He named a specific publicly documented vulnerability that he had failed to patch. Which CVE did he claim was used to compromise LockBit’s servers?
Click flag to reveal CVE-2023-3824
In the same statement, LockBitSupp claimed the FBI acted when it did because LockBit was about to publish stolen documents from a specific US government domain. He framed Operation Cronos not as a law-enforcement victory, but as the FBI protecting politically sensitive material. Which US government domain did LockBitSupp claim the stolen documents came from?
Click to reveal answer fultoncountyga.gov
LockBitSupp disputed the FBI’s claims about the number of decryptors obtained and provided his own figures. Across five years of LockBit operations, approximately how many decryptors did LockBitSupp claim existed in total? Enter the number only.
Click flag to reveal 40000
Three months after the infrastructure seizure, Operation Cronos entered its second phase. In May 2024, the identity behind the alias LockBitSupp was publicly revealed. Law enforcement charged him with 26 criminal counts carrying a maximum sentence of 185 years in prison, and the US Department of State announced a $10 million reward for information leading to his arrest. Who was identified as LockBitSupp?
Click to reveal answer Dmitry Yuryevich Khoroshev
Despite being unmasked, sanctioned, and indicted, LockBitSupp was not captured. Operating from an unknown location, he agreed to a direct interview with `Click Here`, denied being the person law enforcement had identified, dismissed Operation Cronos as a bluff, and made clear he had no intention of stopping. When the journalist asked if he had a message for the world, what was his response?
Click flag to reveal Join my affiliate program and get rich with me
One month after the interview, LockBit was back in the headlines, claiming to have breached one of the most significant financial institutions in the world and threatening to release 33 terabytes of stolen banking data containing Americans’ banking secrets if a ransom was not paid within 48 hours. What domain did LockBit list as the breached institution on its leak site in June 2024?
Click to reveal answer federalreserve.gov
Within the 48-hour deadline, a representative of the alleged victim made contact with LockBit to negotiate. LockBit publicly mocked the negotiation on its leak site, suggesting the offer was insultingly low and demanding that the institution replace the negotiator. According to LockBit’s leak-site post, how many dollars had reportedly been offered?
Click flag to reveal 50000
After the deadline passed, the story shifted. LockBit had made a dramatic claim about the source of the stolen data, but reporting on the released files told a different story. The data appeared to belong to a different financial institution, making the incident look less like a confirmed breach of a major government body and more like a weakened LockBit trying to generate attention after Operation Cronos. Which financial institution did the released data actually appear to belong to?
Click to reveal answer Evolve Bank & Trust
The pressure on Lockbit did not stop. On October 1, 2024, Operation Cronos entered its third phase, revealing that a senior member of another major sanctioned Russian cybercrime organization had been operating as a LockBit affiliate. Which Evil Corp member was identified as a LockBit affiliate?
Click flag to reveal Aleksandr Ryzhenkov
A year after Operation Cronos, in May 2025, LockBit found itself on the receiving end of another breach. Its dark web infrastructure was compromised, its MySQL database was dumped, and its admin and affiliate panels were defaced with a taunting message. What message was left on LockBit’s compromised panels?
Click to reveal answer Don’t do crime CRIME IS BAD xoxo from Prague
After the infrastructure seizure, indictments, unmasking, Federal Reserve embarrassment, and May 2025 database breach, LockBit was still trying to rebuild. In 2025, a new variant emerged: LockBit 5.0. The variant introduced cross-platform encryption capabilities targeting both Windows and Linux systems, including VMware ESXi servers. What was the codename used for LockBit 5.0?
Click flag to reveal ChuongDong