Foxy is a threat intelligence lab centred around analysing ThreatFox CSV export files using command-line tooling. The investigation covers a range of malware families including CobaltStrike, IRATA Android RAT, AdWind/JAR RAT, Dridex, and Log4Shell exploitation. The workflow involves grep, wc, and Gnumeric to interrogate large threat feed datasets, cross-referenced against external sources including MalwareBazaar, Joe Sandbox, and Twitter/X threat researcher posts.
The SOC flagged outbound connections from three internal hosts to hxxp://45[.]63[.]126[.]199/dot[.]gif. Grepping the ThreatFox exports confirmed the indicator:
bash
cat * | grep -i 45.63.126.199/dot.gif
The result returned a high-confidence (100) ThreatFox entry tagging the URL as a CobaltStrike botnet C2, with aliases including BEACON, Agentemis, and cobeacon. This is a classic CobaltStrike staging pattern — a benign-looking GIF endpoint masking C2 traffic.
To determine the full scope of dot.gif usage across all export files:
bash
cat * | grep -i dot.gif | wc
Result: 568 URLs referencing the dot.gif endpoint across all exports.
A SHA256 hash detected and quarantined on an executive’s Android device was submitted for analysis:
6461851c092d0074150e4e56a146108ae82130c22580fb444c1444e7d936e0b5
MalwareBazaar identified the sample as IRATA — an Android banking trojan/RAT. Following the reference link to a Twitter/X post from a threat researcher provided additional context on the infrastructure:

| Indicator | Value |
|---|---|
| Threat Name | IRATA |
| C2 Domain | uklivemy[.]gq |
| C2 IP | 20[.]238[.]64[.]240 |
| Registrar | Freenom |
The Joe Sandbox analysis at hxxps://www[.]joesandbox[.]com/analysis/1319345/1/html was reviewed for MITRE ATT&CK Collection techniques. The following five techniques were identified under the Collection tactic in alphabetical order:
This indicates IRATA has significant data harvesting capability targeting mobile devices — contacts, SMS, location, stored app data, and network enumeration. High risk to an executive device with access to sensitive communications.
A junior analyst flagged outbound connections to 192[.]236[.]198[.]236 without further investigation. Grepping the ThreatFox IP:port exports:
cat * | grep -i "192.236.198.236"
The IP was identified as a botnet C2 for AdWind (also known as AlienSpy, JSocket, Frutas, UNRECOM, JBifrost, Sockrat) — a Java-based cross-platform RAT. Two ports were in use:
The reference link pointed to a Twitter/X post from @ddash_ct providing the C2 domain: ianticrish[.]tk
The likely delivery method into the organisation was Phishing (T1566). Further investigation of the reference material identified the weaponised Word document used for delivery:
Filename: 08.2022 pazartesi sipari#U015fler.docx
This document dropped the following JAR payload:
JAR: NMUWYTGOKCTUFSVCHRSLKJYOWPRFSYUECNLHFLTBLFKVTIJJMQ.jar
Discord’s CDN has been observed being abused for malware hosting and distribution. The relevant CDN base URL is:
hxxps://cdn[.]discordapp[.]com/attachments
Counting references across all export files:
bash
cat * | grep -c "https://cdn.discordapp.com/"
Result: 565 rows referencing the Discord CDN. The malware family being widely distributed via this infrastructure is Dridex — a prolific banking trojan.
When evaluating indicators for proactive blocking on a web proxy, confidence rating is critical to avoid blocking legitimate traffic. Filtering full_urls.csv for confidence rating of 100:
bash
cat full_urls.csv | grep -c '"100",'
Result: 39,993 rows with a confidence rating of 100 — safe candidates for web proxy blocking.
An analyst reported suspicious activity from an IP using source port 8001. Filtering full_ip-port.csv in Gnumeric for malware_printable = Unknown malware and port 8001 identified:
IP: 107[.]172[.]214[.]23
The reference link pointed to a Twitter/X post from @bad_packets confirming the IP was attempting to exploit CVE-2021-44228 — better known as Log4Shell. A critical unauthenticated RCE vulnerability in Apache Log4j reported in November 2021, weaponised almost immediately in the wild via rogue LDAP callbacks.
| Type | Value |
|---|---|
| URL | hxxp://45[.]63[.]126[.]199/dot[.]gif |
| IP | 45[.]63[.]126[.]199 |
| SHA256 | 6461851c092d0074150e4e56a146108ae82130c22580fb444c1444e7d936e0b5 |
| Domain | uklivemy[.]gq |
| IP | 20[.]238[.]64[.]240 |
| IP:Port | 192[.]236[.]198[.]236:1505 |
| IP:Port | 192[.]236[.]198[.]236:1506 |
| Domain | ianticrish[.]tk |
| URL | hxxps://cdn[.]discordapp[.]com/attachments |
| IP | 107[.]172[.]214[.]23 |
| CVE | CVE-2021-44228 |
| Technique | ID |
|---|---|
| Phishing | T1566 |
| Ingress Tool Transfer | T1105 |
| Command and Scripting Interpreter | T1059 |
| Collection — Mobile (Access Contact List, Capture SMS, Location Tracking) | Various |
| Exploit Public-Facing Application (Log4Shell) | T1190 |
ThreatFox export analysis is a practical skill for proactive threat hunting and indicator enrichment. Grep and wc are sufficient for large dataset interrogation at L1/L2 level — no complex tooling required. Cross-referencing ThreatFox entries with Twitter/X threat researcher posts and sandbox reports (Joe Sandbox, MalwareBazaar) is standard enrichment workflow. Discord CDN abuse for payload delivery is well-documented and worth implementing as a detection rule. High-confidence (100) ThreatFox indicators should be fed directly into proxy blocklists as part of a proactive threat intel pipeline.