Sysmon 14 introduced FileBlockExecutable — a proactive defense capability that prevents executable files from being written to disk based on configurable rules. This lab explores the feature through real blocked events, hash-based threat intelligence enrichment, and writing detection rules to block executables dropped by weaponized Office macros.
Opening Event Viewer as administrator and navigating to:
Microsoft → Windows → Sysmon → Operational
Filtering on Event ID 27 (FileBlockExecutable) surfaces all blocked executable write attempts. The first blocked event occurred at:
8-22-2022 3:55:16 PM

Examining the first Event ID 27 reveals the process that initiated the blocked download:
c:\program files\google\chrome\application\chrome.exe
Chrome attempting to write an executable to a monitored location — consistent with a drive-by download or user-initiated malware download from the browser.

The SHA256 hash from the first block event is submitted to URLHaus for threat intelligence enrichment. The tags on the URLHaus entry identify the malware family as:
a310logger
A keylogger/infostealer — exactly the kind of payload that FileBlockExecutable was designed to stop before it ever touches disk.
The reference article by Olaf Hartong demonstrates how to configure FileBlockExecutable rules. To prevent Microsoft Word from dropping executables (a common weaponized macro technique), the relevant config line without the name property is:
<Image condition="image">winword.exe</Image>
This sits inside a <FileBlockExecutable onmatch="include"> block and prevents any executable write operations initiated by winword.exe.
The block-downloads-config.xml in /Downloads/Sysmon/ uses a TargetFilename rule to block executables in the Downloads folder. Adapting this rule to target the OS-level Temp directory:
<TargetFilename condition="contains all">C:\windows;temp\</TargetFilename>
The contains all condition with a semicolon-separated list means the path must contain both C:\windows AND temp\ — precise enough to avoid false positives while catching temp directory drops.
Searching Event ID 27 logs for the hash ending in B4A2 reveals the blocked file:
freeb13.dll
Submitting this hash to VirusTotal and checking the Community tab surfaces the source URL where the DLL was being pulled from:
hxxp://safe-car[.]ru/lib/freebl3[.]dll
FileBlockExecutable doesn’t only block .exe files — it also covers:
DLL, XLL, WLL
XLL and WLL are Excel and Word add-in formats respectively, both commonly abused for macro-based payload delivery.
A key limitation noted in the Olaf Hartong article (as of August 2022): files downloaded via browser show the TargetFilename as a randomly generated Windows temp filename rather than the actual filename. The property hoped to address this in future Sysmon versions is:
OriginalFileName
This would give defenders much better visibility over what was actually blocked, rather than a random temp path.