// BTLO  ·  Email AnalysisDFIR

BEC-KY Lab

BTLO Easy Azure AD Exchange
Initial Access Credential Access

BEC-KY BTLO Investigation Summary

Investigation Overview

Step Objective Key Findings Evidence
1 – Identify the initial phishing source Locate the malicious email that started the compromise. Suspicious sender: sabastian@flanaganspensions.co.uk – look-alike phishing domain. Email headers & message details
2 – Determine the type of compromise Classify the attack vector. Business Email Compromise (BEC) – attacker used valid credentials to send fraudulent transfers. No malware observed; activity originated from CFO mailbox
3 – Trace attacker IPs Identify unauthorized sign-in sources. 159.203.17.81 and 95.181.232.30 – anomalous geo-locations aligned with transaction timing. Azure AD sign-in logs filtered for victim (Becky)
4 – Identify the destination bank Determine where funds were transferred. First Bank of Nigeria Ltd. (SWIFT: FBNINGLA) SWIFT code found in compromised email threads
5 – Detect inbox folder creation Check for persistence or activity hiding mechanisms. Folder named “History” created via inbox rule. Azure audit log showing "MoveToFolder" event
6 – Analyse malicious rule keyword Understand filtering behavior. Rule deleted emails containing “Withdrawal” Rule log: SubjectOrBodyContainsWords="Withdrawal"; DeleteMessage=True

🔍 Attack Narrative

  1. A phishing email from a spoofed domain tricks Becky into interacting.
  2. The attacker compromises the CFO mailbox and initiates legitimate-looking bank transfers (classic BEC behavior).
  3. Azure sign-in logs reveal two suspicious IP addresses:
    • 159.203.17.81
    • 95.181.232.30
  4. Transaction emails include SWIFT code FBNINGLA, linked to First Bank of Nigeria Ltd.
  5. The attacker creates a hidden folder called “History” using an inbox rule.
  6. A malicious rule automatically deletes emails containing “Withdrawal”, removing evidence of fraudulent activity.

🛡 Key Defensive Takeaways


🎯 MITRE ATT&CK Mapping