| 1 – Identify the initial phishing source |
Locate the malicious email that started the compromise. |
Suspicious sender: sabastian@flanaganspensions.co.uk – look-alike phishing domain. |
Email headers & message details |
| 2 – Determine the type of compromise |
Classify the attack vector. |
Business Email Compromise (BEC) – attacker used valid credentials to send fraudulent transfers. |
No malware observed; activity originated from CFO mailbox |
| 3 – Trace attacker IPs |
Identify unauthorized sign-in sources. |
159.203.17.81 and 95.181.232.30 – anomalous geo-locations aligned with transaction timing. |
Azure AD sign-in logs filtered for victim (Becky) |
| 4 – Identify the destination bank |
Determine where funds were transferred. |
First Bank of Nigeria Ltd. (SWIFT: FBNINGLA) |
SWIFT code found in compromised email threads |
| 5 – Detect inbox folder creation |
Check for persistence or activity hiding mechanisms. |
Folder named “History” created via inbox rule. |
Azure audit log showing "MoveToFolder" event |
| 6 – Analyse malicious rule keyword |
Understand filtering behavior. |
Rule deleted emails containing “Withdrawal” |
Rule log: SubjectOrBodyContainsWords="Withdrawal"; DeleteMessage=True |